Explain what an ISDA master agreement is meant to achieve.
The idea
An ISDA Master Agreement is a standard contract published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association. Two counterparties sign it once and then use it for every over-the-counter derivative they trade with each other. Its purpose is to replace a fresh negotiation for each deal with a common legal framework. That framework has a pre-printed Master with general terms, a Schedule for the parties' own elections and additions, a Credit Support Annex for collateral, definitions booklets for product terms, and a short Confirmation for each trade. Section 1(c) makes all of these one single agreement, which is what allows close-out netting. On default every trade is valued and combined into one net claim, so a liquidator cannot keep the profitable trades and disclaim the losing ones (cherry picking). The agreement cuts legal and operational risk and, with legal opinions on enforceability, lets a firm count netted rather than gross exposure. It does not remove credit risk, set prices or require collateral by itself.
A practice question
What is the primary purpose of an ISDA Master Agreement between two derivative counterparties?
- To set a standard legal framework in which all their OTC trades form one agreement that can be netted - correct
- To fix the price and economic terms of every trade at inception so that no individual confirmations are neededWhy not: Confuses the master with the trade Confirmation, which records notional, rate and maturity for each deal.
- To guarantee that each counterparty's obligations are fully collateralised whatever its credit qualityWhy not: Collateral exists only if the parties add a Credit Support Annex; the master itself does not remove credit risk.
- To transfer the credit risk of their trades to a clearing house through novationWhy not: Describes central clearing, not a bilateral master agreement between two parties.
The master agreement standardises the legal terms once, makes every Confirmation part of a single agreement, and so enables close-out netting. It does not set prices, force collateral or clear trades.
A harder one
A bank has signed an ISDA Master Agreement with a counterparty in a jurisdiction for which it has no legal opinion on the enforceability of close-out netting. For regulatory capital, how should the bank normally measure its exposure to that counterparty?
- On a net basis, because the signed agreement is sufficient evidence that netting is enforceableWhy not: A signature does not decide enforceability; local insolvency law does, which is why reasoned legal opinions are needed.
- On a net basis with half of the netting benefit disallowed as a haircutWhy not: Invents a partial credit; recognition depends on legal certainty, it is not scaled by a haircut.
- As zero, because the agreement eliminates the exposureWhy not: The agreement does not eliminate exposure; if netting is not recognised the full gross exposure remains.
- On a gross basis, because netting is not recognised without a supporting legal opinion - correct
Netting is recognised only where the bank has a well-founded opinion that close-out netting would be enforced in the counterparty's jurisdiction; the agreement alone is not enough.
The hardest tier
A bank has four trades with a counterparty under one ISDA Master Agreement, valued to the bank at +30, +20, -25 and -15 (USD million). The counterparty defaults and unsecured claims recover 40 percent. With enforceable close-out netting the bank claims the net amount; without it the bank must pay the negative-value trades in full and claims the positive ones in the estate. Measured against the portfolio's pre-default value, closest to how much larger is the bank's loss when netting is NOT enforceable?
- USD 6.0 millionWhy not: This is the loss when netting is enforceable (net claim 10, less 40 percent recovery), not the extra loss.
- USD 30.0 millionWhy not: This is the total loss without netting; the question asks for the increase over the netted loss.
- USD 24 million - correct
- USD 20.0 millionWhy not: This is the recovery on the gross claims of 50, reported as if it were a loss.
Pre-default value is +10. Without netting the bank pays 40 and recovers 0.4 x 50 = 20, ending at -20, a loss of 30. With netting it recovers 0.4 x 10 = 4, a loss of 6. The difference is 24.
In the app: 6 practice questions on this outcome, spaced review that brings it back before you forget it.
Start free →More in Netting, Close-out and Related Aspects
- Sum up netting and close-out procedures, multilateral netting included, with their pros and cons, and show where they sit in the ISDA master agreement framework.
- Outline how well netting cuts credit exposure across different scenarios.
- Outline how termination provisions and trade compressions work and account for their strengths and weaknesses.
- Give worked cases of compressing derivative positions, find the net notional exposure figure and say which counterparty ends up holding the net contract position.
- Name and outline termination events and review how they could affect the parties to a transaction.