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Lay out what follows when policy moves beyond the region of stability, and how those outcomes have changed over time for advanced and emerging market economies.

FRM® Part II · Current Issues in Financial Markets · Monetary and fiscal policy: safeguarding stability and trust · FRM2.CI.5.b

The idea

Outside the region of stability, one of two failures appears, and often both. If monetary policy is too loose for the inflation pressure, expectations de-anchor and inflation becomes persistent, with a weaker currency and higher long-term yields. If fiscal policy is unsustainable, debt rises faster than the economy can service it, risk premia and yields climb, and banks holding government bonds suffer losses. The end game is default, financial repression or fiscal dominance. Under fiscal dominance the central bank is pushed to finance the government and gives up its inflation goal. Over time the outcomes have shifted. Advanced economies suffered high inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s but, with independent and credible central banks, enjoyed low inflation for decades. Emerging markets historically faced inflation spirals, currency crises and defaults, often with foreign-currency debt, but many have improved through better frameworks, flexible exchange rates and local-currency bond markets. The exam point is that credibility moved the boundary of the region, and it can move back.

A practice question

From the question bank, with the reason each wrong option is wrong.

Fiscal dominance describes a situation in which:

  1. the central bank sets interest rates independently of government borrowing needs, and the government adjusts its budget to match those rates.Why not: Describes monetary dominance, the reverse arrangement in which fiscal policy adapts to the central bank.
  2. the government runs a surplus large enough to retire all outstanding debt.Why not: Confuses dominance with a surplus; fiscal dominance arises when debt and deficits are too large, not when debt is retired.
  3. the government's debt burden constrains the central bank, which keeps rates low or buys debt instead of fighting inflation. - correct
  4. the central bank and government coordinate to tighten policy at the same time.Why not: Confuses dominance with coordination; there is no joint tightening, and the central bank loses control of inflation.

Under fiscal dominance, the need to finance debt and deficits dictates monetary policy, so the central bank cannot raise rates enough or ends up monetising debt, and inflation is no longer controlled. It is the opposite of monetary dominance.

A harder one

Which statement best describes how outcomes beyond the region of stability have changed for emerging market economies over recent decades?

  1. Emerging markets have become more exposed to hyperinflation as their local-currency bond markets deepened.Why not: Reverses the effect: deeper local-currency markets reduce currency mismatch and have helped limit the extremes.
  2. Many have moved away from inflation spirals, currency crises and default through credible central banks, flexible exchange rates and local-currency debt markets. - correct
  3. Outcomes have not changed at all, because emerging markets still borrow almost entirely in foreign currency and have no credible central banks.Why not: Ignores the shift towards local-currency borrowing and stronger frameworks seen in many emerging markets.
  4. Advanced economies, not emerging markets, historically suffered the currency and default crises, and the roles have since reversed.Why not: Reverses the history: emerging markets were the ones with recurrent inflation spirals, currency crises and defaults.

Emerging markets historically faced inflation spirals, currency crises and defaults, often with foreign-currency debt. Many have since improved credibility, adopted flexible exchange rates and issued more in local currency, so outcomes beyond the region have become less severe, though not eliminated.

The hardest tier

A government's debt is 100% of GDP, all at a fixed 3% coupon, with a zero primary balance. Real growth is 1%. An unexpected inflation episode lifts inflation to 6% for the year, against 2% expected. Ignoring any higher borrowing cost on new debt, the year-end debt-to-GDP ratio is closest to which value, and why is it not a lasting solution?

  1. 96.2%, but the gain is temporary because refinanced debt will reprice at higher yields. - correct
  2. 100.0%, because only the expected inflation rate matters for the debt ratio.Why not: Uses the expected 2% inflation, where 1.03 / (1.01 x 1.02) gives 100.0%, instead of the actual 6%.
  3. 102.0%, because inflation raises the interest burden and the debt is not inflation-linked.Why not: Leaves inflation out of nominal GDP growth, so 1.03 / 1.01 gives 102.0%, although fixed coupons do not rise with inflation.
  4. 97.2%, and the gain is permanent because the debt is at a fixed coupon.Why not: Drops real growth from the denominator (1.03 / 1.06 = 97.2%) and wrongly assumes the gain would last.

Debt ratio = 100 x 1.03 / (1.01 x 1.06) = 96.2%. Unexpected inflation erodes the real value of fixed-rate debt, but investors demand higher yields as debt rolls over, so the gain is temporary: this is an inflation tax, not a solution.

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