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Sum up what regulators found in the USAA case study and set out the lessons drawn from it.

FRM® Part II · Operational Risk and Resilience · Case Study: Financial Crime and Fraud · FRM2.ORR.11.b

The idea

The USAA case study concerns a US federal savings bank whose regulators found that its anti-money-laundering programme had not kept pace with the business. The findings centred on weaknesses in transaction monitoring, in customer due diligence, and in investigating and filing suspicious activity reports on time. Supervisors concluded that the programme was deficient and required remediation under enforcement action. The lessons are general. Scale compliance staffing, technology and rules with growth in customers and products. Refresh the risk assessment when the business changes. Clear alert backlogs and meet reporting deadlines. Give the board and senior management real accountability, and test the programme independently. Exam point: the failure was one of programme design and resourcing across the framework, not a single rogue employee or a market loss.

A practice question

From the question bank, with the reason each wrong option is wrong.

In the USAA case study, what did regulators principally find to be deficient at the bank?

  1. Its market risk model, which understated the trading losses of the bank's treasury deskWhy not: Invents a market risk failure; the case concerned financial crime compliance, not trading.
  2. A rogue employee who concealed unauthorised positions in order to inflate bonusesWhy not: Describes a rogue-trader scenario, not the programme-level compliance weaknesses found.
  3. Its AML programme: monitoring, due diligence and suspicious activity reports - correct
  4. A cyber attack that exposed customer data and forced a system shutdownWhy not: Confuses the case with a data breach; the findings concerned AML controls.

Regulators concluded that the bank's anti-money-laundering programme, including monitoring, due diligence and timely suspicious activity reporting, was inadequate.

A harder one

Missed deadlines for filing suspicious activity reports were among the weaknesses regulators identified. Which element of the anti-money-laundering framework does this failure most directly concern?

  1. Placement controls at the point where cash first enters the bank's branch networkWhy not: Placement is a laundering stage and is not the control element concerned with report timeliness.
  2. Detection and reporting: investigating and escalating alerts on time - correct
  3. Customer identification and verification at the point of account openingWhy not: Identification happens at onboarding; late filing concerns the later investigation and reporting step.
  4. Segregation of duties in the accounting ledger and journal-entry approvalsWhy not: An internal fraud control, unrelated to the filing of suspicious activity reports.

Late suspicious activity reports are a failure of the monitoring-investigation-reporting chain, which is the link between detecting unusual activity and informing the authorities.

The hardest tier

A bank under a regulatory enforcement order for anti-money-laundering weaknesses is planning its remediation. Which plan best reflects the lessons of the USAA case?

  1. Replace the compliance officer and rely on that change alone, as the weakness was a single individual's failure of judgementWhy not: Treats a programme-wide weakness as an individual failure; the lessons concern resources, governance and design.
  2. Fix the monitoring system going forward only, since past activity is outside the scope of the orderWhy not: Omits the look-back; remediation normally includes reviewing prior activity to identify and report missed suspicious transactions.
  3. Look back for missed suspicious activity, refresh the risk assessment, add resources, and have the board oversee tested progress - correct
  4. Reduce reporting by tightening alert thresholds until the regulator's backlog metric is comfortably metWhy not: Optimising metrics rather than detection repeats the original failure and invites further findings.

Effective remediation is programme-wide: past-activity review, updated risk assessment, adequate resources, board accountability and independent testing to confirm the fixes work.

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